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Recent Developments
The Antitrust Laws and One-Bank Holding Companies:
Breaking into the Piggy Bank*
The phenomenon of the one-bank holding company, at one extreme, has been called a
"great threat"1 to our nation; at the other, it has been branded "the most attractive
thing that has come down the pike since the mini-skirt." 2 All labels aside, however, the
recent proliferation of one-bank holding companies 3 is raising many eyebrows as to
their purpose and possible dangers.
Realistically, the purpose underlying the formation of a one-bank holding company
is to evade certain bank regulatory statutes, 4 the foremost of which is the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956.5 The Congress has long professed the policy that banks
should be restricted to the "business of banking" 6 and should not be allowed to expand
their activities to the possible detriment of the banking public. 7 In 1938, President
Roosevelt called upon Congress to enact legislation aimed at controlling the activi-
ties of bank holding companies, 8 but his request was not fulfilled until Congress passed
the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956.9 This Act represented the first comprehensive
*The author of this Recent Development is the recipient of the Washington D. C.
Metropolitan Area Alumni Award for the best Recent Development or Case Note to ap-
pear in Volume XVIII.
1. Statement of Rep. Wright Patman, Chairman of the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1968, at 65, col. 1.
2. This is the attitude of Mr. Justin T. Watson, First Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency. See Janssen, One-Bank Holding Companies: A Treasury Preoccupation, Wall
Street J., March 11, 1969, at 20, col. 3.
3. In 1965 there were 550 one-bank holding companies which held $15.1 billion in
commercial deposits. By 1968 there were 783 one-bank holding companies with $108.2
billion in commercial bank deposits. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 91st Cong., ist Sess. REPORT ON THE GROWTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK
HOLDING CoMPANIEs-Problems and Prospects 5 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT]. As of Dec. 31, 1968, 34 of the nation's 100 largest commercial
banks had either set up a holding company or had announced plans to do so in the near
future. This figure includes the top five commercial banks, with assets totalling approxi-
mately $74 billion. Id. at 6. See also Washington Post, March 1, 1969, § D, at 6, col. 1.
4. This was admitted by Mr. William S. Renchard, Chairman of the Board of the
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company. He asserted that rather than trying to evade
the law the bank was taking advantage of the law as it was now written. N. Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1968, at 46, col. 5.
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (Supp. 111, 1965-67), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48
(1964) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
6. The term "business of banking" is popular in the banking statutes. See, e.g.,
National Bank Act § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 24 ( 7) (1964) ; Federal Reserve Act § 4, 12 U.S.C.
§ 341 ( 7) (1964). The problem is that no absolute limits have ever been given the
term. But see National Bank Act § 28, 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), which prohibits, except
under certain circumstances, a bank from holding real property.
7. Kirst, Diversification by National Banks, 21 STAN. L. REv. 650, 654 (1969).
8. S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
9. For a capsule history of proposed bank holding company legislation between 1938
and 1956, see P. HOGENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF GROUP BANKING 152-54 (1955);
S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1955).
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treatment of bank holding companies.1 0 Its passage was based in part on the philoso-
phy that bank holding companies should confine their activities to management and
control of banks, with such activities being consistent with the public interest.11 More
important, however, was the belief that "bank holding companies ought not to man-
age or control nonbanking assets having no close relation to banking."1 2 Congress took
great pains to ensure the implementation of this philosophy. Section 4 of the Act 13 was
designed to prohibit a bank holding company from acquiring any nonbanking assets
and, for those companies which had acquired such assets before the passage of the Act,
there was a provision ordering complete divestiture.14 In addition to this restriction,
Section 615 of the Act effectively prohibited a bank which was subject to the control of
a holding company from lending either "horizontally" or "vertically," that is, either to
its parent company or to a sister subsidiary.'
6
It would appear that Congress had effectively stripped the bank holding company
of its most advantageous characteristics, but this is not the case, for the Act is appli-
cable only to a bank holding company which holds 25 percent or more of the voting
shares of each of two or more banks.17 This limitation leaves at least two prominent
loopholes. First, a holding company is free to acquire as many banks as desired with-
out regulation so long as it does not hold more than 25 percent of the voting shares in
any two of them. Use of this technique would probably not present a regulatory prob-
lem, for there is little advantage in holding a minority interest in a series of banks. The
second loophole, which is more clearly an exemption, is the one-bank holding
company. Such a company can completely avoid regulation under the Act if it holds
the voting stock in only one bank.
18
The theoretical justifications for this exemption are questionable. In 1966, while
considering amendments to the 1956 Act, the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
10. By § 19 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1964), Congress made
"holding company affiliates" subject to limited Federal Reserve Board control by re-
quiring the affiliate to get a voting permit from the Board before being allowed to vote
their stock in any member bank. The granting of the permit was conditioned upon the
"holding company affiliate" allowing the Federal Reserve Board to examine its relation-
ship to the bank. The effect of this provision was not very profound because it applied
only where a member bank was involved and could easily be avoided if the "holding
company affiliate" chose not to vote its stock.
11. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
12. Ibid.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1964).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (Supp. III, 1965-67).
15. Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 6, 70 Stat. 137 (repealed 1966).
16. In repealing Section 6, Congress did not completely rescind its prohibitions. Sec-
tion 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964), was amended to include
bank holding companies. This change is quite dramatic. There is a shift from the abso-
lute prohibitions of Section 6 to the flexible standards of Section 23A, which allows a
bank to lend to its parent or sister subsidiary an amount up to ten percent of its capital
stock and surplus in the case of any one affiliate and an absolute maximum of 20 per-
cent to all its affiliates.
17. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 2(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1964).
18. At first blush this would not appear to be advantageous to a holding company.
But if the bank held is the Bank of America with $23.3 billion in assets or the Chase
Manhattan Bank with $16.7 billion, the focus becomes more clear. See Washington
Post, Mar. 1, 1969, § D, at 6, col. 1.
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mittee concluded that there was no evidence to sustain a finding of abuse on the part
of one-bank holding companies, and that "repeal of the exemption would make it
more difficult for individuals to continue to hold or to form small independent banks.
The repeal of the exemption would, therefore, be likely to result in causing the forced
sale of large numbers of banks and in a diminution of competition rather than in an
increase of competition."1 9 While sounding appealing to a small-business oriented Con-
gress, this argument fails to recognize the potential abuse which may result from con-
tinuance of the exemption. In 1955, when the Act was being considered by Congress,
Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin opined that a holding
company controlling only one large bank may be the cause of far more serious abuse
than a company which controls a cluster of smaller banks. Thus, he argued, any defi-
nition of a bank holding company should be written to include the one-bank variety. 20
Again, in 1958 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in reporting to
Congress on the effectiveness of the Act after two years of operation, observed:
[i]f the act related only to regulation of the expansion of bank holding com-
panies, such a "two bank" definition would be unobjectionable. It is not ade-
quate, however, to effectuate another major purpose of the statute-divest-
ment of nonbanking interests of bank holding companies. Since a company
controlling only one bank is not covered by the definition, it is not required to
divest itself of any nonbanking organization it might control. Yet, if it is con-
trary to the public interest for banking and nonbanking businesses to be under
the same control, the principle is applicable whether the company controls
one bank or a hundred banks and the possibility of abuses from such control
is the same.
21
Under current law, a bank which sets up a holding company can become a viable
commercial entity, for it is free to invest in nonbanking commercial enterprises 22 by
loaning funds to its parent holding company or to a sister subsidiary.2 3 This invest-
ment ability, however, is only part of the impact on nonbanking commerce. Banks are
19. S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
20. Hearings on H.R. 2674 (superseded by H.R. 6227)Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1955). See also Hearings on S. 880,
S. 2350, and H.R. 6227 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1955).
21. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
REPORT TO COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY ON BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT,
8-9 (1958).
22. Mr. R. A. Peterson, President of the Bank of America has indicated that the
bank's holding company may become active in leasing, warehousing, mutual funds,
land development financing, travel bureaus, and "other industries closely related to
financing." N. Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1968, at 59, col. 7. Bank of America has in fact been
granted approval to purchase an 80 percent interest in Digitran Corp., a computer soft-
ware company, for $5 million. See 404 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (April 8,
1969). The Chemical New York Corp. (Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.) has indi-
cated that it will seek to enter such nonbanking areas as temporary help, protective serv-
ices, automobile rental agencies, cleaning services, oil and gas property appraisals, and
computer service bureaus. N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1968, at 37, col. 1.
23. See discussion supra note 16 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, d (Supp. III, 1965-67).
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the major and in some cases the only source of credit in our economy. The danger of
manipulation of this credit system to fullfill the desires of a bank to expand its activi-
ties can only have adverse effects upon the nation's competitive economy. There is a
real danger that banks which set up holding companies for their own purposes will
concentrate their attention on these companies and will sometimes be compelled to
extend credit to them "to the detriment of other competitive businesses in the com-
munity and possibly also to a degree which would be unsound from a banking view-
point." 24 "Compelled" lending is perhaps the most subtle of the dangers lurking in the
unregulated bank holding company; yet more obvious and important are the antitrust
ramifications.
Antitrust Policy
An inquiry into the antitrust question requires reference to the Bank Merger Act of
1960,25 since one of the purposes of both the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act is to prevent concentration of economic power within the banking sys-
tem. 26 To enforce this policy against bank holding companies, Congress in 1956 pro-
vided that the antitrust laws2 7 were to apply to such companies notwithstanding other
provisions of the Act.28 This declaration was a recognition by Congress of the 1953
holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that Section 7 of the Clayton Act
29 is
applicable to a bank holding company where it is shown that an acquisition by such a
company of the stock in another commercial bank tends to lessen competition or cre-
ate a monopoly.30 Thus, it became firmly established that a bank holding company
could be subjected to antitrust proceedings.
After the passage of the 1956 Act, a two-pronged attack against an acquisition thus
was possible-through the Act and through the antitrust statutes.3 1 This favorable
24. H. R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 16 (1955).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. III, 1965-67), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1964).
26. Most of the applications filed with the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to Sec-
tion 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1964), involve a
registered holding company seeking to acquire the shares of another bank. See, e.g., In
re Barnett Nat'l Sec. Corp., 1967 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1913.
27. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) ; Clayton Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1964).
28. This was provided in the saving provision incorporated into the 1956 Act. See
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 11, 70 Stat. 146 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1849 (Supp. III, 1965-67).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
30. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 901 (1953).
31. Since the Act was comprehensive, the need for application of the antitrust stat-
utes seldom arose. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §§ 3, 4, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842,
1843 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1843 (Supp. III, 1965-67). However, in
one instance the Federal Reserve Board granted permission for an acquisition which the
Department of Justice felt was clearly anticompetitive. In United States v. Marshall &
Ilsley Bank Stock Corp., 255 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Wis. 1966), the district court held that
the Federal Reserve Board was to be the final arbiter as to whether or not the Clayton
Act was to be invoked against the bank. The court relied on 15 U.S.C. § 21 (a) (1964),
which gives the Federal Reserve Board antitrust jurisdiction over those cases which in-
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
situation, however, was to last but ten short years. In 1966, Congress amended the Act,
and in so doing undercut the full force of the Clayton Act.3 2 Justification for this ac-
tion was based upon the belief that the antitrust provisions of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act should be consistent with those of the Bank Merger Act as amended in
1966.33
The above discussion, although not presently relevant to the one-bank holding com-
pany in light of its exemption, is germane if the best possible solution to the problem
is being sought. On February 17, 1969, Rep. Wright Patman introduced a bill into the
House of Representatives3 4 which would make the Bank Holding Company Act appli-
volve banks, banking associations and trust companies. The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, and reversed, 387 U.S. 238 (1967), relying upon the reasoning in United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), to the effect that an agency rul-
ing is not determinative in light of the statutory provision for de novo judicial review.
Id. at 368.
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b)-(f) (Supp. III, 1965-67). Subsection (b) provides for
a 30 day statute of limitations, i.e., the Attorney General must commence an antitrust
action within 30 days from the date an acquisition is approved by the Federal Reserve
Board, or he is barred. This provision does not apply to an action brought pursuant to
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). Should the Attorney General insti-
tute an action in time, subsection (e) provides that the court before which the action is
pending must apply the same substantive law which the Federal Reserve Board must
apply under Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)
(Supp. III, 1965-67).
Section 3 (c) provides that the Board shall not approve any acquisition "whose effect
... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which
in any other manner would be in restraint or [sic] trade, unless it finds that the anti-
competitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public in-
terest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of
the community to be served." (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if a transaction clearly
violates Sherman or Clayton, it will be allowed if an overriding public interest can be
shown. The Supreme Court, interpreting these same provisions under the Bank Merger
Act has held that the burden of proving an overriding public interest is upon the bank.
United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967). See also United States v.
Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
33. Compare the Bank Merger Act of 1966 § 1, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c) (7) (A),(B)
(Supp. III, 1965-67), with the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 § 11, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1849(c)-(e) (Supp. III, 1965-67). The Department of Justice vehemently argued that
there was no justification for such a consistent application. The argument was based upon
the fact that the 1966 amendment to the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was a reaction by
Congress to United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), which
held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to bank mergers. On the other
hand, Congress felt the antitrust laws should be applicable to bank holding companies
when it passed the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956. This was evidenced by the in-
clusion of the saving provision (12 U.S.C. § 1849(a) (Supp. III, 1965-67), formerly,
70 Stat. 146 (1956)). See Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to former
Chairman A. Willis Robertson of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, May
18, 1966 (112 CoNG. REC. 12,385, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)). It is interesting to
note that the amendments to Section 11 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 were
"tacked on" after the hearings and after the House report, during consideration in the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. See the remarks of Senator Phillip Hart,
112 CONG. REc. 12,433-34, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
34. H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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cable to a holding company controlling any bank.35 By adopting this approach, Rep-
resentative Patman hopes to prevent the abuse which can result from the present
loopholes 36 and in so doing to effectuate the purposes of the 1956 Act.
A somewhat different approach has been recommended by Senator William Prox-
mire in a bill introduced into the Senate on February 18, 1969.37 Although he recom-
mends that the one-bank holding company be made subject to the Act, he adopts this
only as a temporary approach to the problem. 38 The Senator is of the opinion that the
one-bank holding company phenomenon is a reaction by the banks to the strict regula-
tions presently applicable to the banking industry. Based upon this philosophy, he does
not think that an adequate solution can be achieved solely by the inclusion of the one-
bank holding company in the Act.39 It is his belief that any nonbanking acquisition
"must be considered on its own merits and the competitive impact of bank entry must
be carefully assessed." 40 From a policy standpoint then, it seems to this author that it
will be better to deal with the problem through the antitrust statutes.
41
Confronted with these two potential solutions, it is clear that a straight antitrust
approach would offer the better and more effective solution.42 Pursuant to Representa-
tive Patman's proposal, the one-bank holding company would be granted the opportu-
nity to defend against charges of antitrust violations if it can show that an acquisition
will serve the "convenience" and "needs" of the community. 43 There can be no possible
justification for giving a holding company this privilege, especially when its activities
have extended beyond the sphere of bank related business. A holding company is a
corporation like any other, and the fact that a bank is one of its subsidiaries should not
be the basis for special treatment, especially with regard to application of the antitrust
statutes.
44
Application of the antitrust statutes would require a case-by-case approach. Al-
though this process would undoubtedly be slow and complicated compared with
mere inclusion of the one-bank holding company in the Bank Holding Company Act,
it affords a mechanism more finely attuned to prevention of abuses which may result
35. Id. § l(a).
36. See 115 CONG. REc. H903, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1969).
37. S. 1052, 9 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
38. See 115 CONo. REc. S1696, 1698, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1969).
39. Id. at S1697.
40. Ibid.
41. Senator Proxmire's proposal is indeed complex. He believes that a new institu-
tional framework for assessing competitive effects is necessary as the existing bank regula-
tory agencies are ill-equipped to make such judgments. The Senator also seems to be of
the opinion that present antitrust policy must also be re-evaluated. Ibid. The bill calls
for the creation of a National Committee on Banking. This committee will appraise the
role of banking in the national economy. Id. at S1698.
42. See Comment, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws:
Competition Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 535 (1962); Berle, Banking under the Anti-
Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 589, 602-03 (1949). But see Mogel, Bank Mergers and
the Antitrust Laws, 17 AM. U.L. REv. 57 (1967).
43. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
44. It is maintained that the antitrust statutes apply to banking in exactly the same
way as they apply to other businesses. See Seeley, Banks and Antitrust, 21 Bus. LAW.
917, 921 (1966). See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352
(1963).
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from the utilization of the one-bank holding company device. Since proliferation of the
large one-bank holding companies did not begin until the summer of 1968,45 actual
abuses cannot be pinpointed. The following anticompetitive effects may, however, re-
sult if the one-bank holding company remains unregulated.
Anticompetitive Effects of One-Bank Holding Companies
Aside from factors previously mentioned, 46 others compel the forceful application of
the antitrust laws. The foremost perhaps is the so-called "tie-in" arrangement whereby
a bank "ties" an essential bank service-e.g., the extension of credit-to the purchase
of other services from either the bank, its parent holding company, or a sister sub-
sidary.4 7 The obvious effect of such an arrangement is to channel business to the other
participants in the holding company structure to the detriment of other businesses
competing within the same geographical area. The anticompetitive effect is brought
more clearly into view if the bank is the only source of the necessary service within a
particular area. The Department of Justice has reacted strongly against such arrange-
ments, arguing that they constitute an effective restraint of trade
4 8 and therefore are in
direct violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
4 9
Application of the Sherman Act is difficult however, because of its requirement that
an action be presently in restraint of trade before there is a violation.
5 0 This showing of
present restraint is not required under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
5 1 All that need be
shown is that a particular transaction will tend to lessen competition or restrain
trade.5 2 Thus, Section 7 of the Clayton Act is designed to prevent an anticompetitive
45. As of Sept. 1, 1968, there were 684 one-bank holding companies which held $17.8
billion in total deposits. Between Sept. 1, 1968 and Dec. 31, 1968, seven new one-bank
holding companies were formed and 92 were proposed. These figures represent $90.4
billion in bank deposits. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
46. See note 25 supra.
47. See Kirst, Diversification by National Banks, supra note 7, at 656 (1969). The
potential abuses of this "tie-in" arrangement were recognized by Rep. Wright Patman.
His bill, H.R. 6778, would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prohibit a bank,
a bank holding company, or any subsidiary of a bank holding company from conditioning
an agreement to provide a customer one bank service on the requirement that the cus-
tomer agree to give the bank, or another subsidiary of the parent holding company,
business in other areas.
48. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (auto manufacturer's coercion of dealers to finance their
wholesale purchases through a particular finance company held violative of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act). Private parties have also been successful in challenging "tie-in" ar-
rangements. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 89 S. Ct. 1252
(1969). The "tie-in" arrangement is similar to the reciprocal purchasing agreement,
forbidden by Section 3 of the Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). See United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
"Tie-in" arrangements have been called illegal per se. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 146-47 (1965).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
50. Section 1 reads, "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade . .. ."
51. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
52. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 115-18 (1955).
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transaction before it can effectively be consummated.5 3 The criteria which courts have
utilized to determine whether or not a transaction will have long-run anticompetitive
effects are many and varied; yet most of them can be effectively applied to trans-
actions involving a one-bank holding company.
In United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,5 4 the district court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction blocking a proposed merger between Wilson, the leading manufac-
turer of sporting goods in the nation, and another corporation which was a leader in
the manufacture of gymnastic equipment, an area into which Wilson desired to ex-
pand. The court based its decision in part upon the fact that the proposed merger
would prevent market entry by a potential competitor-i.e., Wilson.55 This, the court
reasoned, ultimately lessened potential competition within this particular market.
It is not difficult to envision a similar set of circumstances in a case involving a one-
bank holding company where market entry is more likely to be accomplished by way
of acquisition rather than by formation. This fact, taken in combination with others,
may lead a court to decide that the holding company, instead of increasing competi-
tion by entering the market as a "new" competitor, is effectively reducing the level of
competition.5 6 This is not to say, however, that a "new" entrant will automatically be
sanctioned. The entry into the market of a highly financed holding company may have
the effect of dissuading a smaller potential competitor from entering the same mar-
ket.57 Consider, for example, the case of a "small" independent businessman who
wishes to invest some of his capital in speculative real estate transactions but is hesi-
tant to do so because his foremost competitor is the Bank of America, acting through
a holding company.58 Coupling this possibility with the entry problem discussed above,
clearly the mere presence of a one-bank holding company at the doorstep of a non-
banking commercial activity reduces potential competition to a significant degree.
The potential entry problems affect competition primarily from the "outside"-i.e.,
the addition of a "new" independent competitor to an existing market is prevented. A
far more dangerous reaction may occur within the market; existing participants in the
market may seek to create a formidable competitive mechanism in the hope that they
can maintain their relative competitive position within the market. Thus entry into a
53. Ibid. See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
54. 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968). For a treatment of the problems presented by
the Wilson case, see 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 219 (1968).
55. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 562-63 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
56. Suppose, for example, that a bank holding company desires to enter the auto leas-
ing business. Instead of forming its own leasing company, it acquires either Hertz or
Avis. Surely the holding company has lessened competition to the degree that it would
have advanced had a "new" entrant been formed. For an example of how a court might
treat such a transaction, see General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
57. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1313, 1356 (1965). See also United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288
F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
58. One-bank holding companies are more inclined to enter into real estate trans-
actions than any other nonbanking, nonfinancial area of activity. For example, as of Sept.
1, 1968, 111 out of 397 one-bank holding companies which engage in nonbanking, non-
financial activities were engaged in leasing and operating real estate. See STAFF REPORT,
supra note 3, at 51.
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given commercial area by a one-bank holding company may trigger a series of respon-
sive mergers,5 9 finally resulting in market control becoming concentrated in two or
more commercial "giants." This type of activity will only further raise the barriers
against successful market entry and increased competition by existing potential en-
trants. The court in Wilson recognized this when it said, "[s]uch a trend would decrease
the possibility of long run deconcentration of [an] industry by eliminating potential
additional competitors, and would tend to decrease existing competition by elimi-
nating as potential competitors the very firms on the edge of the market who are able
to exert an effect upon the pricing decision of existing firms." 60 There is also the possi-
bility, the court reasoned, that competing giants may tend to reach different competi-
tive decisions than would smaller firms in a more highly competitive market. This is
especially true where the threat of entry by other possible competitors has been sub-
stantially diminished.6 1
All of the criteria thus far discussed, taken singularly,62 would probably not consti-
tute anticompetitive effects sufficient to hold a proposed aquisition by a one-bank hold-
ing company violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. These criteria however, cannot
be considered separately but are dependent upon, and complementary to each other.
This being the case, it is clear that the entry of a one-bank holding company, being a
combination comprised of both commercial skill and financial power, may have an
inherent deleterious effect upon competition but whether or not these effects are suffi-
cient to restrain such an entry can only be determined after due consideration is given
to the facts of a particular case. In those situations where anticompetitive effects are
found, the appropriate remedies can be obtained under existing antitrust legislation.
63
Another approach which should be considered is based upon the hypothesis that a
distinction should be made between entry by a one-bank holding company into an area
closely related to its financial activities and entry into a strictly commercial area.
64
59. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962), the Supreme
Court noted that the possibility that a given merger will foster other mergers, thus lead-
ing to further concentration of economic power, is a relevant factor in assessing the anti-
competitive effects of that merger.
60. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 558 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
61. Ibid.
62. With the possible exception of the "tie-in" arrangement. See note 48 supra and
accompanying text.
63. Section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964) provides for the
issuance of a cease and desist order requiring a person to cease and desist from violating
the Act and to divest himself of stock or other capital or assets held in violation of Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
64. This distinction has been incorporated in the administration bill introduced into
both the House and the Senate on March 24, 1969. See S. 1664, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4 (1969); H.R. 9385, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 4 (1969). This bill would require that
the three bank regulatory agencies determine together whether or not an acquisition is
financially related, with each agency having a veto power. This procedure is not pres-
ently desirable since each agency has a different attitude toward the one-bank holding
company. The Federal Reserve Board favors strict regulation while the Comptroller of
the Currency is more disposed to allowing the expansion of such companies in the belief
that they are conducive to a healthy economy. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
takes a middle ground, i.e., that the one-bank holding company may be good for the
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Some persons believe that banks have been unduly restricted in the types of activities
in which they can engage and consequently have not been able to diversify to meet the
threat of external competition. 65 There is therefore some justification for allowing a
bank to acquire an interest in activities closely related to its functions as a bank. 66
Proposed Solution
With this distinction in mind, the best solution would be to amend the Bank Holding
Company Act to include the one-bank holding company. Such an amendment would
confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Reserve Board to evaluate the proposed acquisi-
tions of such companies pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Board.67 It is sug-
gested that this jurisdiction should be limited to evaluating acquisitions closely related
to banking activities. Such an approach would be appropriate since the Board has
expertise in this area but not in nonbanking and nonfinancial commercial matters. In
such cases, the ultimate decision should be made by the executive authority responsible
for protecting the nation against activities which may tend to lessen competition or to
restrain trade-the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
It would not be difficult to accomplish this shift of jurisdiction. The repeal, with the
exception of subsection (a), of Section 1168 of the Bank Holding Company Act would
have the effect of making the antitrust statutes applicable in their full force. In order
to prevent undue burden upon the administrative machinery of the Department of
Justice, the initial determination as to whether a proposed acquisition is financial or
nonfinancial in nature should be made by the Federal Reserve Board. This determina-
tion should be based upon an independent set of criteria to be formulated by the
Board. Once there has been a determination that the proposed acquisition is of a non-
banking or nonfinancial character, the executive authority would determine whether
any action should be brought under the antitrust laws, just as it does in the case of
any ordinary non-banking merger or acquisition.
This proposal would restore the antitrust statutes to their full strength as they might
apply to bank holding companies. The 30 day statute of limitations, and the affirma-
tive defense of public need and convenience would both be discarded in favor of the
time-tested antitrust statutes.
economy but it should to some extent be regulated. See, N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1968, at
47, col. 1.
65. This basically was the view put forth by Senator Proxmire on the occasion of the
introduction of his bill, S. 1052, to the Senate. 115 CoNo. REC. S1697, 9 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1969). In accord are the views of Chairman K. A. Randall of
the F.D.I.C. See Speech before the Baltimore Chapter of the American Marketing
Association, Oct. 18, 1968. (CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. % 95,049 at 80,037).
In fact, the Federal Reserve Board has frequently granted permission to registered
bank holding companies to acquire stock or assets in other banks where there is no show-
ing of any adverse competitive effects. See, e.g., In re Valley Bancorp., 1963 FED. RE-
SERVE BULL. 178; In re United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 1962 FED. RESERVE BULL.
1620. See also In re Charter New Corp., 1966 FED. RESERVE BULL. 527 (where
permission was granted upon a showing that there were benefits to the community).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326n.5 (1963).
67. 12 C.F.R. §§ 222.101-222.122 (1968).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b)-(f) (Supp. III, 1965-67).
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